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Globalisation of production has been accompanied by a rise of in-
formal and insecure work across different regions of the world, 
even in formal establishments. Yet, the role of labour has received 
scant attention in both the governance and analyses of global pro-
duction networks (GPNs). Therefore, activists and scholars have 
demanded a “sea-change in the international business model and 
the active participation of informed and empowered work-
ers” (Brown 2013: 5) that needs to be flanked by an analytical 
framework that puts workers’ agency at the centre. 
This has motivated us to analyse the Freedom of Association Proto-
col, a voluntary initiative (VI) that has been implemented in the In-
donesian sportswear industry since 2011. In that year, Indonesian 
exports of leather and leather goods peaked, generating more than 
230 million USD in revenues (Statistics Indonesia 2014: 107). Over-
all, more than 600,000 workers were employed in the footwear in-
dustry in the same year, including production for the domestic mar-
ket (CCC 2014). In export factories manufacturing footwear for Nike 
alone, one of the largest foreign buyers, more than 128,000 workers 
are currently employed, the vast majority of which are women 
workers (Nike 2014). 
From the perspective of Wright’s (2000) theory of the factors ena-
bling positive class compromise, we have asked under which condi-
tions VIs with a more active role for labour can emerge. Wright 
(2000: 958) defines positive class compromise as “mutual coopera-
tion between opposing classes”. It involves concessions in favour of 
the interests of people in the opposing class. His central argument 
is that the possibilities for stable, positive class compromise hinge 
on the relationship between the strength of workers’ organisations 
(i.e., ‘associational power’) and their ability to help capitalists to 
solve collective action and coordination problems. 
Freedom of association (FoA) and collective bargaining (CB) are 
often referred to as ‘enabling rights’, implying that, when these 
rights are respected, workers can use them to ensure that other 
labour standards are upheld. While they often formally 
acknowledge the relevance of FoA and CB, VIs in labour-intensive 
sectors such as the sportswear industry have a notoriously poor 
record of implementing and monitoring these collective labour 
rights. We consider the Indonesian FoA Protocol an far-going struc-
tural commitment to strengthening labour. Its study might there-
fore contain lessons for forms of non-governmental labour regula-
tion that are less far-going in their concessions in favour of labour. 
Workers’ Struggles in Indonesia and the Emergence of an Alter-
native Model 
All main producer countries for athletic sportswear, namely China 
and Vietnam alongside Indonesia, have a history of severely cur-
tailed collective labour rights. Both in China and Vietnam, workers 
are legally restricted to form independent unions. In Indone-
sia, the Suharto regime (1967-1998) strongly restricted trade 
union activity and the employee’s voice in the workplace. This 
regularly included army intervention in the case of workers 
struggles. 
These struggles nonetheless had an impact beyond the local 
and national level when Western media began to cover these 
events, highlighting sweatshop conditions at famous brands 
like Nike, Adidas etc. During the 1990s, the contacts between 
Indonesian labour NGOs and transnational anti-sweatshop 
networks such as Oxfam Australia, the European-based Clean 
Clothes Campaigns (CCC), the US-American United Students 
Against Sweatshop (USAS), the International Textile Garment, 
Leather Workers Federation (ITGLWF, now IndustriALL) and 
others became more intense. This international collaboration 
was continued in the post-Suharto era, e.g. in the Play Fair 
campaign. Launched in connection with the 2004 Olympic 
Games held in Athens, this cross-border alliance sought to 
push sportswear and athletic footwear companies, the Inter-
national Olympics Committee and its national organising 
committees, as well as national governments to take concrete 
measures to address violations of workers’ rights in supply 
chains. 
The end of the Suharto regime removed earlier restrictions on 
trade union establishment, leading to a steep rise in the num-
ber of trade unions. Yet, these political and legal changes did 
not end the violence, intimidation and the imprisonment of 
outspoken workers or union officials. Despite continued re-
pression, Indonesian trade unions are among the most mili-
tant in the region. Therefore, workers’ struggles often escalate 
before even an attempt at finding a resolution can be mount-
ed in the context of existing VIs. The FoA Protocol described 
below addresses this situation by paving the way to a more 
effective guarantee of collective labour rights at the firm level. 
On June 6, 2011, a protocol on FoA was signed by Indonesian 
trade unions, large Indonesian sportswear manufacturers and 
multinational sportswear brands, including Adidas, Nike, Pu-
ma, Pentland, New Balance, and Asics. The ratification was one 
of the results of sportswear campaigns around the 2008 Bei-
jing Olympic Games. The protocol stands out for three rea-
sons: firstly, it led to a process of negotiations around a proto-
col that provides companies with a set of guidelines on how 
to uphold and respect trade union rights; secondly, it involved 
both direct employers and ‘indirect’ employers, i.e. the brands 
that that have a powerful role these production networks; 
and, thirdly, the process was driven by Indonesian union fed-
erations instead of being imposed upon them as is most VIs.  
Nicolas Pons-Vignon  
E-mail: Nicolas.Pons-Vignon@wits.ac.za 
  
The resulting Protocol establishes practical guidelines for how to 
ensure that factory workers in Indonesia are able to organise and 
collectively bargain for better conditions in their workplaces. The 
agreement also covers areas concerning non-victimisation of 
trade union officers and members as well as a non-intervention 
pledge on the part of employers into trade union activities. In ad-
dition, the Protocol describes in much more detail than the na-
tional law (let alone, multinational brands’ VIs) what rights unions 
can claim at the factory level. This includes, e.g. the right to have 
an on-site union office, to publicise materials, to access workers 
etc. Indonesian union representatives find the Protocol to be more 
detailed than the law, giving more space for workers to organise 
as a result. 
The FoA Protocol: Putting Workers’ Agency at the Centre? 
While it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the FoA Protocol, 
against the backdrop of union oppression in Indonesia’s export 
industries, its ratification as such is a significant achievement. Yet, 
it raises the question why capitalists would submit to the unattrac-
tive option of structural collaboration with labour through a VI? 
Indonesian workers’ associational power was enhanced through 
transnational labour solidarity networks, yet, five diverse local un-
ions were at the forefront of the negotiations for the FoA Protocol. 
This is reflected in the Protocol’s stipulations, which caters to the 
practical needs of local unions rather than referring to abstract 
principles. The coordination on the labour side increased pressure 
on producers and brands who had a less united and clear agenda, 
but also allowed them to solve their respective collective action 
problems. This included addressing producers’ concerns regard-
ing the choking of production through fierce labour struggles. The 
Protocol also ensures that defecting producers do not achieve 
competitive advantage at the expense of collective labour rights. 
For sportswear brands, the Protocol offers a unique opportunity to 
protect and increase their reputation as a business community 
that is ‘playing fair’ with regards to collective labour rights. Overall, 
it allows actors in the athletic footwear industry in Indonesia to 
move from a situation of confrontation to one that has the poten-
tial to catalyse cooperation and benefit workers. 
Critical question marks are also due. Firstly, we have concentrated 
on the question which factors have catalyzed the emergence of 
the FoA Protocol as a VI with the potential to create spaces for 
workers’ collective agency. Yet, the actual impact for guaranteeing 
Indonesian sportswear workers’ collective rights will be the litmus 
test for the Protocol’s effectiveness. Secondly, we have implicitly 
defined workers in the Indonesian athletic sportswear industry as 
those directly employed in manufacturers’ plants. A significant 
number of workers are employed in second tier suppliers, though. 
Despite trade unions’ and their partners’ attempts to extend the 
coverage of the Protocol to second tier producers, these efforts 
were met with resistance from brands. Hence, even if effective for 
directly employed workers, one may question whether this VI can 
be seen as truly contributing to strengthening labour. Thirdly, the 
sphere of politics may deserve more attention. Which role did the 
Indonesian political class play in the emergence of the Protocol? 
While the ratification of the FoA Protocol can be seen as signaling 
a move towards a greater degree of enforceability of the VI and 
inclusiveness regarding the actors involved, we are not yet per-
ceiving a greater commitment of the Indonesian state to enforce 
legally guaranteed collective labour rights. 
Overall, we conclude that while the spatial dispersion of produc-
tion has weakened state mechanisms for the guarantee of labour 
rights, new pressure points for labour have also emerged, e.g. 
brands’ reputation or just-in-time production. Besides, new possi-
bilities for transnational labour networks have opened that 
strengthen workers’ associational power. Moreover, GPNs frag-
ment capital in different factions, such as producers and brands. 
Their material concerns are not necessarily the same. Workers’ 
movements might be able to benefit from such divergent inter-
ests, especially if they are in a position to help solving producers 
and buyers’ collective action problems. We conclude that if VIs are 
to create conditions under which decent work can be strength-
ened, the involvement and strength of local labour organisations 
is required and producers’ and/or buyers’ dependence on work-
ers’ cooperation may act as a catalyst.  
1 A longer version of this column has been published as an ISS working 
paper: http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51297/ 
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